1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

racial or national equality, clean government, peace, and reconstruction. [185]

Uighurs and Kazakhs were immediately appointed to high posts in their own districts. All non-Chinese nationalities were allowed to promote education in their own languages and schools. The number of students increased from 3000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and in addition 329 non-Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union to study medicine, veterinary science, engineering, and agriculture. Under the provincial Bureau of Education in Urumchi, five branch bureaus were opened: at Sharasume, Chuguchak, Kulja, Aksu, and Kashgar. 175* 178

The provincial newspaper *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* set up branch offices at the same five places, and another at Chingho. Editions were published in seven languages. "Cultural associations" began to function for Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tungans, Tatars, Russians, and Chinese. Of these the most active was that of the Uighurs, the majority people, with 8 regional and 41 district branches, supporting 1736 primary schools with 124,174 students, and also conducting teacher training and adult education.[43]

For a time, there was even relatively clean government. Under Yang and Chin it had been possible for a magistrate to pocket 80,000 to 100,000 Chinese dollars a year. At the beginning of Sheng's administration, inspectors and auditors were sent out to prevent such speculation. More than any other reform, however, this one depended on the degree to which the system as a whole really functioned in a democratic way. After 1940, when Sheng was officially appointed Chairman of the Provincial Government, he became more and more autocratic and suspicious, and an old provincial saying began to be heard again: "The provincial Chairman may be less fat than the Bureau head, and the Bureau head may be less fat than the Regional Administrator, who in turn may be not so fat as the District Magistrate" — the District Magistrate, as the closest to the people, being the official with primary access to sources of "squeeze."[44]

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–84.
[44] Chiang Chün-chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–84.

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Sheng himself is quoted by the man who was the director of his provincial newspaper as saying that he was not a member of the Kuomintang, so that "It is strange that they should have elected me a member of the Kuomintang Central Control Committee!" [47]

After coming to power with Soviet military assistance, Sheng negotiated a Soviet loan of five million gold rubles for reconstruction purposes. This loan, which involved no political or economic conditions, carried an interest of 4 per cent.[48] Sheng also asked for Soviet technical assistance. In 1937 he instituted a three-year plan of reconstruction, during the course of which he obtained a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans. In 1938 the Provincial Commercial Bank was reorganized as the Sinkiang Commercial Bank, with partly private and partly Provincial Government capital. It issued new notes, and the currency was to a large extent stabilized. By the end of 1939 the old paper currency was declared invalid. During 1939 credits of $17,872,500 (Chinese) were granted to the bank to promote commercial and agricultural capitalization. Funds from the Soviet loans were used to build more motor roads, and trucks in use increased from only 20 in 1933 to 400 in 1938 and eventually to 3000 in 1941. In the same period, 1350 miles of telephone lines were installed. By 1939, there were some 20 factories in the province, and over 400 tons of Soviet machinery had gone into the construction of a refinery at an oil field northwest of Urumchi.

The development of aviation involved the National Govern-

Communist advisers from Yenan to come to Sinkiang. He later executed some of these advisers and jailed the rest. Miss Anna Louise Strong has kindly let me see her unpublished notes of interviews with survivors of this group, at Yenan, after the war. These notes suggest that the Communists are inclined to claim credit for all the reforms of Sheng Shih-ts'ai in his "progressive" period, even before 1938; but the record as a whole seems to make it clear that the reforms were initiated by National Salvationists and other liberals, before the arrival of the Communist advisers. The currency reform of 1938, however, appears to have been the work of Mao Tze-min, brother of Mao Tze-tung, who was executed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1943.

[47] Sa Kung-liao, *op. cit.*

[48] Tu Chung-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94.

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*175 ment as well as the Provincial Government. Under the Nanking-
● 178 Moscow Nonaggression Agreement of 1937, a through air route
648 had been stipulated. Under the Soviet-Chinese Trade Agreement of June 16, 1939, a Sino-Soviet Aviation Corporation was organized. By the terms of these agreements, Russia obtained priority over other countries in air traffic, jointly with China, over Sinkiang.

*175 In 1941 Sheng decreed a second three-year plan. The economic
648 activities of the Provincial Government were expanded through
185 "Foreign Trade and Local Resources Companies." Reconstruction bonds were issued; and the combined effects of inflation in
436 China and a trade boom in Sinkiang raised the exchange value of the Sinkiang dollar from the low point of 4000 to one Chinese national dollar in 1934 to a rate of six to one national dollar in 1942. At the time Sheng left the province in 1944, the rate was five provincial dollars to one national dollar. The boom was largely promoted by an arbitrary linking of the "official" exchange rate between American dollars and Soviet rubles, which enabled Sinkiang to buy from the Soviet-operated Sinkiang Trading Corporation at artificially favorable rates. During this period many Russians entered the province as technicians, but — according to the British observer already quoted, who visited the province in 1940 — there was nothing to suggest that Soviet administrative control was being forced on Sinkiang.

*175 In retrospect, it is clear that Sheng Shih-ts'ai was guided
648 throughout by opportunity rather than by principle. Even while carrying out reforms, which for some years were encouragingly successful, he did not lose his concern for his own interest. This concern led him into a policy of sudden shifts in his relations with Russia, in contrast with the policy of steady neutrality pursued so long and so successfully by Yang Tseng-hsin. From 1933 to 1940 he leaned toward the Soviet Union and away from the National Government of China. From 1941 to 1942 he cut off his relations with the Russians roughly and suddenly, and threw himself on the support of the National Government in a manner suggesting he had little confidence in his own power in his own

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1
Kazak

acquire the determining political power within clans and tribes and secure the best allocations of pasture. Disputes over winter quarters are the most common cause of quarrels between clans and tribes, and similarly the fact that good winter quarters are often on land suitable for cultivation is the commonest cause of friction between Kazakh or Mongol nomads and colonizing Uighur or Chinese farmers.

The economic development of the Sinkiang and Russian Kazakhs has not been uniform since the Soviet Revolution. The pastoral economy of the Sinkiang Kazakhs has not improved, but conditions have become worse where the Chinese authorities have permitted colonization of some of their territory by Uighurs or Chinese. On the Soviet side of the frontier, the traditional nomadic economy has been strongly modified. "Clan collectivism" has given way to socialist collectivism. Winter quarters and summer pastures are owned by collectives which are not necessarily formed out of kinship clans; the breeds of livestock have been improved; and agriculture has been developed in combination with the pastoral economy. In addition industrialization has been introduced on a very large scale, including coal and copper mining. In coal mining, particularly, a fairly large Kazakh labor force is engaged; and out of industry and the improvements in farming and herding have developed opportunities for higher education and technical training.

The Kazakh language belongs to the Turkic group of the Altaic family, and is closely related to other Turkic languages in Inner Asia, and to Osman Turkish. The language of Sinkiang and Soviet Kazakhs is identical. There was almost complete illiteracy among both groups until the Soviet Revolution. The small number of literates, mainly within the upper classes and the clergy, used the Arabic alphabet, which is unsuited to the phonology of the Turkic languages. After the Bolshevik Revolution a Latin alphabet was introduced, with the addition of a few special letters; this script was replaced in 1940 by the Cyrillic alphabet, again with the addition of a few special letters. The attack on illiteracy went slowly in the first years under the Soviet system. In 1931, 77 per

• 178 The totally new factor of
154 machine-powered industrialism is
now beginning to penetrate the lives of both cultivators and
[412] herdsmen. Industrially equipped engineering could lead water to fields which the oasis cultivator, working with his broad-bladed mattock, the traditional Inner Asian *ketman*, could never reach. Modern industry could process the wool and hides of the livestock breeder in ways which the nomadic society was never able to evolve. In addition, it could exploit mineral resources in ways which would make it possible to put together, out of the unjoined fragments which lie scattered through Sinkiang, a new, many-sided society of farming, livestock breeding, mining, industry,
[382] technology, and levels of education previously out of reach. Of
[133] the primary industrial materials, Sinkiang has oil, coal, and probably iron in large but unknown quantities. It has water power. Of the scarcer industrial materials, it has copper. It also has gold.

177 The industrial civilization is approaching Sinkiang from two sides at once. From China, American planes sometimes fly in. A few American trucks and cars are already there. American bulldozers have pushed better roads nearer and nearer. One strategic road has already crossed a corner of the Tibetan plateau to the line of southern oases. American geologists have prospected the mineral resources. American arms equipped the Chinese forces which held the province in the last years of Kuomintang rule.

Soviet industrialization stands much closer to the frontiers of Sinkiang. It has already transformed the face of Soviet Inner Asia with mines, factories, new irrigation works, hydroelectric dams, and more facilities for advanced industrial training than there are in the whole of China. Soviet trade is essential to Sinkiang; and the only non-Chinese natives of Sinkiang who have had modern university training have received it in Soviet territory, not in China.

41 Today in Sinkiang, however, industry is still negligible, and the two principal types of economy are pastoral nomadism and oasis farming. Most of the oasis farming is in the Tarim Basin, where man brings water to the desert by irrigation. The homeland of nomadism is Jungaria, where man adapted himself to geography by abandoning agriculture and taking to the herding of animals.

1: Baltimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

collection of the land tax and livestock taxes in kind, refusing for the receipt of taxes the money issued by his provincial treasury. He had already set up a Provincial Trading Company, which was his personal agent in business; but up to this time it had competed with private trade. In Kashgar, for instance, it handled only about 28 per cent of the trade, less than the proportion handled by an Uighur firm called "Ittifatsherket." In 1942, however, a monopoly of provincial trade was granted to the Provincial Trading Company, which operated on a capital of 2,500,000 United States dollars. Through this company the Governor purchased wool, livestock, cotton, furs, and other products at compulsory prices lower than the market prices, transported them on his own trucks, and sold them to Sovsintorg in exchange for Soviet manufactures. Until 1943 raw materials, though bought at compulsory prices, were paid for in manufactured goods; but further inflationary pressure was then created by paying for such purchases only partly in goods and partly in paper money. The Khotan branch of the monopoly, for instance, paid only 15 per cent of the price of furs and 20 per cent of the price of silk and cocoons with manufactured goods. The abuses of this monopoly caused so much discontent that General Chang Chih-chung was compelled to liquidate the company in 1946.

A new period began in 1943. Governor Sheng, having miscalculated the strength of the Russians, was cold-shouldered by them and had to come to terms with the National Government. The already badly inflated currency of the National Government began to pour into the province, adding to the existing provincial inflation. In 1943 the Provincial Commercial Bank alone was receiving national currency notes at the rate of a million dollars a day. The price index of wheat flour, taking June 1940 as 100, had already increased to 865 by December 1942. In 1945 it jumped to 75,000 and by September 1947 it was 517,500.

Inflation was compounded with other critical developments, some of which had been long maturing, to form an explosive situation. In the first place, there has been a large increase of popula-

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

[161] tion. Less than forty years ago the population of Sinkiang was registered at 2,003,931.[31] The latest official figures give 3,730,051. 178 Neither figure has the reliability that is demanded of statistics in 458 advanced countries, but it is probably true that the population has 47 increased by at least a third and perhaps more. This increase means more peasants on the land in the oases, more who are willing to settle as colonists in nomad territory thereby increasing friction with the nomads, and more who migrate every summer as seasonal laborers from the Tarim oases to Jungaria and even into the republics of Soviet Inner Asia.

Pressure on the land has had a number of bad effects. Peasants are compelled to plant all land every year, leaving none fallow. As a result, one village sampled in the Yarkand oasis showed a decrease in the yield of wheat from fifteen-fold to only five-fold. The example may be exceptional in its severity, but it is representative of a trend.

Pressure on the land also aggravates the problems of land tenure. Increasing trade, especially trade with Russia since 1890, speeded up the change from diversified, self-sufficient agriculture to commercialized agriculture. After 1884 the old *mulkdar* or feudal landholders, who had been exempt from taxes, were compelled to pay a land tax to the Chinese provincial authorities. These two trends together caused money standards to supersede the old standard of hereditary status. The landholder with feudal rights called "the Beg," a term of aristocratic connotation, began to be replaced by a new class called *bai* — a term meaning simply "wealthy," a curious parallel to "plutocrat," which began to come into general use in England in the period of rapid social change marked by the Reform Bill of 1832. The parallel is made closer by the fact that many new *bais* were former Begs, just as in England many new directors of joint stock companies were holders of old landed estates.

[566] The condition of the peasant is governed by the fact that while he lives in a system which is increasingly penetrated by money values, he is also bound down by strong survivals of the old order

[31] Wang Shu-nan, *Hsinchiang T'u Chih*, Ch. 1, pp. 5–7.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

of things, such as the obligation to render labor services to his landlord. In money values, it was calculated in 1943 that the earnings of an agricultural laborer in Khotan for a full year were equivalent only to the value of one twelfth of an acre of medium-grade land. Share rents, however, dominate the lives of most peasants. If the landlord supplies only the irrigation water, the peasant must deliver to him half of the crop. If the landlord also supplies working animals, seed, and implements, he receives two thirds or more of the crop. As, in addition, taxes and other assessments sometimes amount to as much as one third of the crop; the peasant not infrequently has no legal claim to anything whatever at the end of the year, and is dependent on what the landlord thinks it necessary to leave him to keep him alive. This dependence of the peasant on the landlord takes the form of a debt which gives the landlord full control.

The economic crisis in Sinkiang is, in fact, a crisis of interacting and steadily mounting pressures, with no safety valves to give a margin for adjustment.

The exploitation of mines and of industry based on minerals would not automatically solve the agrarian problem. The experience of China has shown that if there is no agrarian reform the agrarian crisis gets worse, not better, in the near neighborhood of industrial centers like Shanghai; and at the same time urban labor, instead of creating a higher standard of living, finds its standards undermined by the rural unemployed. In Sinkiang, as everywhere else in Asia, a higher standard of living on the farm could improve buying power and give an impetus to industrialization; but industrialization alone cannot put an end to the agrarian crisis.

CHAPTER VI Social Structures: The Living Past

The Feudal Heritage

174 HALF A CENTURY AGO, when Western travelers in Sinkiang were most frequent, stagnation was the aspect which they found most striking in the societies of both the oasis dwellers and the steppe nomads. Here in the heart of Asia, time seemed to be standing still. In human society there seemed to be an unending continuity and repetition, but no evolution.

Yet the archaeologists among these travelers, by their startling discoveries of the past as reflected in wall paintings and manuscripts, revealed that the social history of Sinkiang, like its cultural history, had been complex. Here, for twenty centuries of recorded history, the civilizations of India, Iran, and China had interacted. The cultures of settled peoples and pastoral nomads had never ceased to work upon each other. A number of the religions of Europe and Asia had here lived for long periods side by side. To this day, no other Chinese province is so diversified ethnologically, linguistically, in the political importance of its religions, and in the contrasts between the economic systems enclosed within its administrative framework.

Cycles of Centralization and Decentralization

178 Throughout their long history the societies of Sinkiang have, in fact, been climbing the ladder of evolution; but, like other societies, they have at times slipped back several rungs down the

[p. 182]

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ladder. This alternation between evolution and devolution can be most simply described in terms of an alternating centralization and decentralization of social and political structures.

The geographical factors favored decentralization. A population separated by deserts and scattered in oases, mainly self-sufficient and similar to each other, tends to develop social microcosms with no strong superstructure to unite them into a larger state. Similarly in the wide steppe the tribal needs of pastoral nomads are satisfied by the formation of small social units. The evolution of larger, more centralized units requires the stimulus of interaction between the pastoral society and urban and agricultural society. In Sinkiang, the most important agency in keeping the pendulum of social change swinging has therefore been the alternation between centralization under powerful empires and decentralization, with reversion to small social units, in periods between great empires.

This alternation, in turn, was influenced by a recurring phenomenon: the tendency of the ability to conquer to outrun the ability to integrate economically and to administer efficiently. Great empires repeatedly broke up because, instead of becoming more cohesive through the circulation of trade, they found it impossible to organize a profitable interdependence of production in different regions. The mechanism of administration was so crude that too high a proportion of revenue was eaten up by the costs of collecting revenue. The costs and hazards of transport were so high that there was always a tendency for trade to be profitable only if the goods could be virtually confiscated from the original producer.

To a large extent, ancient and even medieval trade was carried on in things which the original maker, grower, miner of metals, or hunter of valuable furs did not produce for profit, but surrendered as tribute under some form of organized compulsion. Empires based on the economics of compulsion fell apart all the more readily, when they lost the power to compel, because in each of their component parts the really essential economic life was relatively self-contained.

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174 In periods both of centralization and decentralization the so-
178 cieties of Sinkiang have reflected different aspects of a slowly evolving feudalism. We have no historical description of a truly "primitive" society in Sinkiang; though the Stone Age finds prove that primitive peoples did once exist there, as in China itself. But the oasis "kingdoms" which the Chinese described some two thousand years ago were feudal, rather than primitive or tribal, both in their structure of rank and power and in such relationships as war and the collection of tribute. Nor do the Chinese chronicles describe steppe nomadism at a truly primitive level, but rather at the level of the formation of war bands and the development of early institutions to regularize personal loyalty which can be called "early feudal" or "proto-feudal." [1]

In general, it can be said that both the oasis society and the steppe nomad society tended to evolve toward higher feudal forms of development in periods of centralization, and to devolve back toward earlier forms in periods of decentralization. The main difference between the oasis society and the steppe society was that devolution in the steppe society tended to be more extreme, and to fall back to the war-band stage of development at the very threshold of feudalism.

174 A description of the societies of Sinkiang in terms of feudalism
566 must in itself be a test of theories of feudalism. Many Western
114 writers on feudalism are not prepared to admit that there is any society in Asia that can properly be described as "feudal." Lack of material from Asia in Western comparative studies of feudalism is, however, in the main attributable to the lag in Western studies in the social sciences as a whole in Asia.

A more serious difficulty is the fact that there are no criteria of

[1] An interesting attempt to describe what may be called the "process of emergence" of feudalism has been made by Professor S. Yushkov in his article "On the question of the pre-feudal ('barbarian') state," in *Questions of History*, No. 7 of 1946, Moscow, 1946, pp. 45–64 (in Russian). The article is of particular importance because it attempts to compare as "contemporary" (in Toynbee's sense) material taken from ninth and tenth century Kievan Russia, sixth to ninth century Anglo-Saxon England, and eleventh and twelfth century Mongolia.

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service. In 1812, however, an imperial decree allowed the garrison commander at Kulja to divide the Manchu-held land as permanent private property, exempt from tax. Under the terms of grant, such land was not to be leased to others for cultivation, and if farm hands were hired, they must be Manchus.[23] In the course of time, however, these terms became a dead letter and the land was freely leased and even sold to Chinese cultivators, officials and merchants.

In their main lines the structures of both the settled and the nomad societies of Sinkiang, as administratively revised under the Manchu Empire, outlasted the great Moslem rebellions of the nineteenth century and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. They even proved strong enough to contain the gradual commercialization of economic life during the past hundred years. Only now are they finally breaking down, caught between a securely established socialized state in Soviet territory and a rapidly spreading social revolution in Chinese territory.

As they break apart, these structures reveal a multiple stratification, the layers of which can be classified both socially and historically. Socially, they are graduated from arbitrary powers and privileges at the top to disfranchisement at the bottom. Historically, the stratification is more confused. In the alternating cycles of feudalism centralized under a strong imperial overlordship and feudalism decentralized under local oasis-states and rulers of nomad tribes, the incoming phase never completely swept away and replaced the institutions and administrative practices of the outgoing phase. Some of the characteristics of decentralization always lingered here and there, though unevenly, in the strongest phases of centralization; and conversely, even when oases were most completely independent of each other politically, and nomad tribes rejected the overlordship of other nomad tribes, the larger community of the oasis society as such and the society of the pastoral nomads as such was never entirely obliterated.

[23] *Institutes of the Manchu Dynasty*, edition of 1818, section *"Shih Li"* ("Precedents"), Ch. 842, p. 13 (in Chinese).

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178 631 566 As both societies break up, they first dislodge the top structure of the Chinese administrative bureaucracy. This bureaucracy represents all that is left of the centralizing overlord power of China in Inner Asia. It may soon be succeeded by another bureaucracy, as the Communists take over power in China; but for the moment it is breaking up.

Though for nearly forty years it has been ruling in the name of a Chinese Republic, this bureaucracy is essentially the same, both in its functions and in its lack of function, as that which the Manchus set up in the eighteenth century. Economically, it is a surtax on the total revenue of Sinkiang. Politically and administratively it has functioned to keep Sinkiang the same color on the map and to maintain, internationally, the convention that in Inner Asia the domains of the Chinese touch the domains of the Russians. Yet it has never integrated Sinkiang with China, making the life and wealth of Sinkiang a part of the life and wealth of China. The individual Chinese bureaucrat has returned from Sinkiang wealthy; but the Province of Sinkiang has contributed little to the State of China.

Below their own level, the Chinese cut into but at the same time conserved the feudal powers of the local ruling classes. The village elder, the landholding oasis magnate, the Mongol prince, the Kazakh chief — whatever they might be called — were forced to yield a double tribute: one to maintain the Chinese bureaucracy as such, and one to enrich the individual Chinese bureaucrat; but in order to enable them to yield this tribute, they had to be enabled to collect it, and for this purpose their traditional powers were maintained. In this way the surtax necessary to support the Chinese bureaucracy was in fact collected from the oasis farmer and the nomad herdsman.

178 566 438 Trade, in spite of the steady penetration of commercialization in the form of a money economy, preserved the essential feudal characteristic of privilege: both the Chinese bureaucrat and under him the "native headmen" prevented the operation of a free market by selecting individual merchants to whom they extended their protection, enabling them to evade taxes and to become

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

monopolists, sometimes locally and sometimes on a provincial scale. In this way the provincial revenue from trade was cut down, but individually the protected merchant got rich, and enriched the individual bureaucrat or the clique of associated bureaucrats to whom he paid a tribute for his protection.

At the bottom level the individual cultivator and herdsman collected tribute from none, and paid out — in rents and taxes, in forced labor for special projects and in "customary services" to his immediate rulers — the tribute which those above him divided according to their position in the stratification of privilege. Though no legislation declared them to be serfs, both cultivator and herdsman were in fact survivors of the feudal system of enserfment, having duties but no rights, and being prevented from selling their services in a free market by administrative enforcement of the rights of all those above them to collect tribute in kind, forced labor for the community or the province, and "customary services" to individuals. Even the nominal significance of private property in land or cattle, among the poor, was blurred by debt obligations which prevented them from acting as free agents.

When a society breaks up, it never breaks up at random. Every society has its own kind of cohesion, and usually its cohesiveness is unequally distributed over different parts of the society. Between the units of cohesion are lines of stress; and cleavages, when they take place, usually follow these lines of stress. In considering the influences coming from Russia now at work upon the societies of Sinkiang, and the influences that may be expected to develop rapidly from a China in which Communists are consolidating their power, we must take into account both the influences themselves and the balance between cohesion and cleavage already existing within the societies on which they work.

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

Magistrates who succeed in bringing a certain area of new land into cultivation—35,000 *mu* or about 6,000 acres, I believe—receive a good mark at headquarters and are singled out for promotion. This results occasionally in money being wasted on canals along which the water will not run—"Amban's Follies" we used to call them—but it meant that ambitious Magistrates encourage the spread of cultivation in every way and see that new settlers are left alone by the tax-gatherer. For three years a settler on new ground pays no revenue, and half-rates for the next three.

It is true that moral and intellectual progress does not exist in Kashgaria. There are no schools except those attached to mosques, at which nothing is taught by the mullas but reading, writing and the Qur'an. By means of a strict censorship not only are books and all written or printed matter dealing with current events kept from the hands of Chinese and Muhammadans alike, but the dissemination in writing of news or of any ideas whatever among the inhabitants is effectually prevented. All this, no doubt, is highly reprehensible from the point of view of the democratic idealist. But after all, if the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the *summum bonum* for any community, as some people are still old-fashioned enough to believe, there is a good deal to be said for it. At any rate, in this twentieth-century world of hustle and the Yellow Press, of merciless competition and all-pervading publicity, one may be forgiven for hoping—selfishly, perhaps—that a corner of the earth may long be spared in which a peaceful, contented, simple, lovable and by no means uncivilized population exists without motor-cars or cinemas, without newspapers or telephones, without broadcasting or advertisements, without a mile of railway or even of metalled road, a land steeped in the Middle Ages, picturesque and quaint almost beyond belief—truly an Arcady of Cathay.

Of our life and work at Kashgar the part that D. and I liked best was the touring, of which we had plenty. Though the trade between India and Chinese Turkistan is strictly limited by the great length and difficulty of the Leh route, the number of Indians connected with it who are permanently or temporarily resident in the oases of the Tarim Basin is surprising. At Yarkand alone there are usually between 100 and 150 Hindu traders, most of them representing firms in one or other of two Punjab towns, Amritsar and Hoshiarpur. Sindhi money-lenders from Shikarpur ply their trade at Yangi

S
631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian
SN inhabitants in general.
175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking,
SN the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
175 minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
657 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
563 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
669 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784, 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bäk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

SN II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode
175 of Economy of the Minorities.
631
619 Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic conglomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
SN political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
175 of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
631 again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
668 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the
178 Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
619 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-
648 Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road, Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bäk's policy

towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one administrative unit.

The Eastern Turks:

The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through the organized use of water. The family organization among the Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain level of productivity can only be reached through collective labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water is therefore provided for their land.

The Internal structure of the family system is not based upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists. A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form "guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent winter camp site, since this facilitates better political control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz and Kazakhs are ruled by "biks," or "manaps" (elders) responsible to the Chinese officials.

The Mongols: general remarks.

Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods, but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion.

The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes to be ordered around and governed; he ardently defends his own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious. Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency found especially within the extended family, which as a rule feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc., of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace, to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and government, can be described as the average conception of the "good life." The average Chinese of the Northwest lives in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area, caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor altar being almost the only furniture.

Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course, the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money-minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia, became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China, showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep inclination towards Communism.

In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

II. The Turkic People of the Northwest

563 101 A. The New Uighurs (or Eastern Turks)

The Turks of Sinkiang call themselves after the cities where they live, e.g. Kashgarlik, Turfanlik, Kuchalik, etc.... After [668] the Communist Revolution the Communists introduced the term Uighurs for the Eastern Turks, living in the Ili District. The term 563 later was adopted by the Chinese.

144 1. Physical characteristics

In one sense the Eastern Turks are the descendants of the old [167] Uighurs who migrated to present day Sinkiang during the ninth cen- [175] tury A.D., Later they had mixed with Indo-european tribes and other Turkish tribes of the Chagatai Ulus (empire) and to a small degree also with the Mongols. Thus, in the terminology employed by E. Frhr. von Eickstedt, "Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit, Stuttgart, 1934, the Eastern Turks show many europid and some turanid racial characteristics, and only a slight degree of mongoloid traits.

142 A more detailed description of the average physical type of 141 Eastern Turkestan is as follows: dark hair and eyes, (sometimes 563 lighter occasionally blue eyes), white or yellowish skin with sometimes a slight inclination to brown, middle or tall stature, on the average 1680-1700 mm., with a tendency toward obesity. The head is definitely brachycephalic with a length-width index of 85-87, a longish-oval face, with wide cheek-bones, a straight and rather prominent nose, eyes lacking the mongoloid fold, and everted lips.

2. Economy

433 The main occupations of the Eastern Turks are horticulture, 563 agriculture and animal husbandry. The Eastern Turks breed camels, horses, sheep, and goats. They are famous for their fertile fruit-orchards, which are mostly artificially irrigated. Handicraft is fairly developed, but has no economic significance.

3. Religion

791 The Eastern Turks are Moslems, adherents of the Sun sect. 563 However, they display an attitude towards religion. This does [793] not refer to the leading religious clergy who form a kind of a gentry together with the nobility of the rich landowners.

178 4. Social organization

614 In contrast to the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, the Eastern 563 Turks have lost their clan system and tribal organization completely. There is no antagonism between the Eastern Turks and 186 the remaining Turkic tribes, although the nomadic Turkic tribes 563 exhibit some contempt of the Eastern Turks. However, there is an old and remarkable hatred between the Turks and the Chinese, due partly to the greater efficiency and industriousness of the Chinese.

212 5. Literature
563 a. literacy

The Eastern Turks still use the Arabic script. Until recently [668] there was at least 95 per cent illiteracy. The Communist regime apparently has successfuly attempted to fight illiteracy.

b. literature and folklore

538 Since Chagatai times the Eastern Turks have been the bearers
178 of an amazing literature and folklore. For over a hundred years,
563 this intellectual life has been declining. Now nothing remains but primitive samples of that literature which was so famous and influential upon various Turkic peoples.

101 B. The Taranchis

563 The Taranchis are ethnically, linguistically, culturally and
175 genetically the same as the Eastern Turks. Those New-Uighurs who were defeated by the Chinese at the middle of the 18th century and fled to the Russian part of the Ili Area, the Russians called Taranchi, a name that has remained ever since.

C. The Kazakhs

1. Origin and physical characteristics

Prior to the Russian Revolution the Kazakhs were called Kirghiz. Many times they are referred to as Kazakh-Kirghiz, or Kirghiz-Kazakhs or Kirghiz-Kaisaks. The original homeland of the Kazakhs was southern Siberia between the Yenisei River and the Ob River. According to Abulgazi and Rashideddin the Kazakhs were a very small tribe which expanded after the Mongolian conquest and after frequent mergings with Mongolian clans. This [144] explains why the Kazakhs resemble the Mongols so much. In fact [142] 80 per cent of the anthropological features of the Kazakhs are mongoloid, i.e. a strong and square-built trunk with relatively short legs, wide and round heads; in profile only a slight curvature of the occiput (back part of the head) can be seen; the face is wide and flat, high cheek-bones, and typical mongolian eyelid, the nose is flat, hair and eyes are black or brown, the lower jaw is wide and strongly built.

2. Social organization

a. the khanate

563 The Kazakh hordes first belonged to the Chagatai Empire and
175 later to the Golden Horde. During the sixteenth century they formed
619 their own Kazakh Khanate.

b. the tribes

563 The Kazakhs living in Sinkiang belong mostly to the Orta Dzhuz
619 (middle horde), consisting of the following five main tribes: (1) Atagni, (2) Naiman, (3) Argin, (4) Uvak-Girei and (5) Kipchak.

c. the clans

[614] The clan organization among the Kazakhs is very well preserved.

563 Huang-ho and in the surrounding villages. They are also found on
[131] one section of the road from Hsi-ning to Ho-chou. They differ considerably from the average type of Chinese Moslems. They
[142] are tall and lank. They have large and not flat noses, black and level eyes, cheekbones not prominent, long face, thick eyebrows, full black beard, retreating forehead, flattened occiput, brown but never yellow skin. Thus they are similar to the Turks of Chinese Turkestan.

2. Language and religion

[197] The most remarkable characteristic is their language which
[701] might be called a corrupt Turkish. In religion they are strict Hanafis and show great respect to their clergy. However, for the
[273] most part they are rather given to the drinking of spirits. Even
[212] the lowest classes sometimes are acquainted with the Arabic alpha-
[175] bet. They are said to have received their present form of religion from a reformer named Maming-hsin (Muhammad Amin) who taught about 1750.

3. Social organization

[193] The Salars are believed to have settled in their present habi-
[614] tat during the Yuan or Ming dynasty. They claim to have migrated from the Samarkand area. According to Schramm, who quotes General Ma Fu-hsiang, the Salars are subdivided into the "inner
[197] five clans" and into the "outer eight clans" (Chinese: kung). The latter lost their original Turkic language and now speak Tibetan.

[614] The Salars are said to preserve clan traditions very well and they do not marry anyone who does not belong to one of the Salar
[701] clans. They also have a reputation for being very fanatical Moslems, and have participated in all the Moslem uprisings of the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

G. The Sarigh Uighur (Chinese: Huang-fan)

[175] When Mannerheim visited the Sarigh-Uighur in 1907, there were
[361] only 100 families to be found. This small tribe lives in three villages on the northern slopes of the Nanshan Mountains, in the area of Tun-huang, Su-chou and Kan-chou. They have preserved their
[178] tribal name and their Buddhist religion but they gave up their Uighur
[212] script during the eighteenth century and adopted the Tibetan script.

[777] 1. Physical characteristics

563 Mannerheim describes them as generally having excessively
142 prominent cheek bones. But he also saw several people with oval shaped faces and not strikingly prominent cheekbones. However, in general the type of face is short and somewhat broad. Some of the women have thick noses. The mouth shows neither thin nor thick lips. The eyes are small and the distance between them is also normal. (Mannerheim obviously employs European standards when he talks about "normal" or "average.") The corners of the eyes were open and there was no inner epicanthic fold. Their hair

/The New Uighurs/

563 The Sinkiang nomad must buy his bride
[184] with a bride-price, but the sedentary Sinkiang bride is given
[583] away by her father. In addition he even pays all wedding ex-
penses. Marriages are arranged by a "go-between", who usu-
[584] ally occupies a higher social position than either the bride or
[586] groom's families. As in all Moslem communities, divorce is
a relative simple matter for the male. Therefore, a consid-
[589] erable number of women without family attachments are present
in all Uighur communities. These unattached women are usu-
ally engaged in employment as tailors, cooks, or weavers, and
thereby form a distinct social unit. As a rule they are identi-
fied with the household of their employer.

563 In general, all Uighurs are individualistic in character.
62 However, the structure of the community with its irrigational
182 problems gives them a collectivist outlook on life in parts.
[181] The families that form such an Uighur community are by no
means bound together by kinship obligations. Their communal
cooperation rests exclusively on the fact that without collective
effort and labor the community would perish.

563 Prior to 1949, no organized youth groups existed in Uighur
[561] communities, since in any Islamic community the male child
begins to participate in the activities centered around the
mosque at a very early age. All other youth groups were dis-
couraged. The young Uighur man becomes a full member of
[585] the community at the time of his marriage. He will receive
[885] title to any land or water rights only upon the decease of the
eldest male member of his family. Until then both he and his
wife work as members of the extended family group. A young
merchant usually will act as his father's representative until
the father's retirement from business affairs or his death.

563 Merchants are bound together in "guilds". However, these
441 associations are not official institutions but were natural out-
growths of the merchants' self-protecting interests. Should
any member of the community be guilty of not paying his debts,
he will be prosecuted by the members of such a "guild", even
though he may have moved to another community. In each
locality or city, the merchant's "guild" is organized under the
leadership of an aqsaqal, who functions as a public official.

563 Individuals of the Uighur community who do not inherit any
166 land, move to non-irrigated areas which nevertheless show
241 possibilities of being irrigable. These new irrigation pro-
425 jects are usually undertaken as the collective effort of several
families who move as a group to such a new area. This prac-
tice may explain population increases in Uighur occupied
areas.

563 New industries and the further development of natural
178 resources may have some influence upon Uighur social struc-
ture, since these factors increase the wealth of both the

S 563 individual and the community. Natural resources to not seem 178 to be of prime importance in Sinkiang. However, their exploitation [31] through free or forced labor will further break down Uighur kinship ties and thereby alter the social structure. In recent S [464] times large numbers of non-Uighur laborers have been introduced into the area, further augmenting alien cultural elements.

S 563 Uighurs participating in small-scale home industries and 438 handicrafts are organized under the leadership of a Chong-usta. 622 Unlike the merchant's "guild" aqsaqal, he is not a public official.

S 563 Under the Manchu system the Bäks (communal leaders) were 554 classed in five degrees of rank, ranging from the third to the [631] seventh degree of the Chinese official scale. 1. Ak'im Bäk- [641] local governor; 2. Ishkhan Bäk -Assistant Governor; 3. Shang [692] Bäk - Collector of Revenue; 4. Katsanatch'i Bäk - same as above; 5. 'Hatze Bäk - Judge; 6. Mirabu Bäk - Superintendent of Agriculture.

S [312] As discussed previously, the Mirabu Bäk was also the official having authority over water rights and water distribution. In practice the Manchu Amban, highest Manchu official in a given area, chose the Ak'im Bäk who, in turn, chose his own subordinates.

S 563 Farm units were organized as follows: Ten such units were 241 lead by an On-bashi, fifty by an Illik-bashi, one hundred by an 554 Yüz-bashi. The duties of the Bäks and Yüz-bashis mainly consisted of keeping and collecting registers and taxes. This governmental organization was abolished officially by the Chinese Revolution in 1911. However, traces of this structure are still found today.

S 563 The whole Uighur social structure certainly will undergo 668 far-reaching changes under the Communist government. How- 177 ever, at this time only hypotheses about these changes can be advanced. As new cultural and political structures are imposed on the society, kinship ties will be further loosened. The Uighur communisty and its structure will take on new characteristics, as old institutions disappear and new ones are introduced. Except, perhaps, for the nuclear family, social groupings will be brought more and more into accordance with the new ideals of the society.

B. The Sedentary Tibetans

N *563 Much that has been said about the nomadic Tibetans holds [592] equally true for their sedentary counterparts. Again the basic [361] unit is the group of families living together. In the sedentary community, the village may be composed of from a dozen to seventy, eighty or even more houses arranged adjacent to each other. The roofs of the normally two-storied buildings N [342] are close enough to form a pathway, and are used as such.

563 /Sedentary Moslems of Sinkiang/

592 The focus of the family is on the sons, who above all provide
562 the continuity of the family, and also aid the family economically
before they establish their own households. Among the lower
[565] classes, daughters also often are very desirable. There is always
a chance that a daughter, particularly if she is good-looking, will
bring a wealthy husband to the family. The family expects nothing
[582] of their son after the age of 15 or 16 when he marries and sets up
a household for himself.

A statement can be made, applying particularly to the seden-
563 tary Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang, that the relationships within the
592 family are not as fixed and close as they are in China proper.
593 This is due mainly to the factor that the institution of the family
182 as a whole is loosely bound and unstable. Membership in the fam-
ily nucleus changes often with the frequent conclusions and dissolu-
tions of marriages. A great degree of permanency exists among
the agricultural population, but most of the city-dwellers are sub-
ject to constant permutations.

563 The Islamic relationships between husband and wife are the
593 basic patterns existing in Sinkiang, but they have been modified by
178 local customs, and are less rigid and extreme in severity.

593 The husband-wife relationships are not based on equality, legal
562 or otherwise. The differences in the family positions of the hus-
563 band and wife are mainly a manifestation of the general attitudes
toward men and women in Islamic society. A woman is considered
a weak and irresponsible being, who is subject to impulses and
whose behavior is largely irrational. Man, being the superior of
the two, is given the authority and place of importance within the
[671] family. Islamic law, which established the man as leader and
[779] head of the family, obliges him not to misuse his power and to be
generous to those who depend on him. In practice, the prerога-
tives accompanying the husband's superior position are often
abused for his own advantage.

In Sinkiang the women's position is not as low as in other Mos-
lem centers. The wife enjoys some rights which give her a cer-
tain degree of independence and freedom. Under certain circum-
stances, which will be discussed later, she can obtain a divorce
on her own initiative, and she has some property rights. Accord-
ing to Islamic law her foremost obligation is to respect and honor
her husband. Obedience to the husband is stressed in theory but
is not as fully practiced. Women here participate in economic
life to a greater degree than in most Moslem countries, and have
some rights themselves. Consequently, they also enjoy a better
social status. The Moslem women of Sinkiang appear with their
husbands in the presence of male visitors, while in other Moslem
countries they are forbidden to appear in the presence even of
their husband's father or his elder brother. In Sinkiang a woman
frequently leaves the house unaccompanied, without asking the

N
121 Han Chinese have taken up farming. Many of them have also be-
*563 come small business men dealing in camels, sheep, oxen, furs, skins, et cetera. Often those who have settled in cities are restaurant owners. The Moslems are faithful followers of their religion. Although they have taken on the Chinese way of life, the people have always kept their own identity.

S In early times Sinkiang was referred to as Hsi-yü (the West-
101 ern Region) or as T'ien-shan nan-lu and T'ien-shan pei-lu (Road
487 South of the Heavenly Mountains and Road North of the Heavenly Mountains). These names referred to the natural caravan highways which progress westward from Chinese Kansu on either side of the Heavenly Mountains, weaving along and through the watered and cultivated areas.

S The region has the most colorful mixture of race, custom and
563 habit in existence. There are the dark-bearded Uighurs from Kashgar, in long, bright-colored coats, with their veiled and white-clothed women; there are booted Kirgiz from Taghdumbash Pamir; there are the outcast unveiled women from Maralbashi and foreigners from Afghanistan, India, Tibet and Russian Turkestan.

S Here the passage of time seems to bring little change. Mixed
• 178 as they are, the tribesmen of the steppes cling to their time-
563 honored ways, each race maintaining its own traditions. Religion runs the gamut from Mohammedanism and Lamaist Buddhism to Christianity. It is a land of mosques and lamaseries, of centuries-old irrigation ditches, of "Turban Heads" and Chinese Moslems. It is an open land of lean Kalmuch nomads and hard Kirgiz frontiersmen, of Kazakh cowboys galloping across the steppe.

N Of all these peoples in the Northwest, we have selected for
S our study seven groups, namely: the Han Chinese, the Chinese
121 Moslems, the Kirghizs, the Kazakhs, the new Uighurs or East-
*563 ern Turks, the Mongours, the Tibetans and the Western Mongols. The Mongols of Alashan and Edsingol are now part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Their value system and life patterns do not differ appreciably from those of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Reference is therefore made to the same section in the IMAR Handbook.

III. Social Values and Patterns of Living of the Peoples in the Northwest

N
*563 ### A. The Han Chinese

*175 The Han Chinese of the Northwest region are predominantly
[463] farmers, artisans and merchants. During China's era of Imperial government, and during the Nationalist period as well, the region and its borders have often been involved in war with the

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

286 Khotan is the most famous of the cities in Sinkiang in the
531 production of the famous oriental rugs, in needlework and also
199 in metal works (Kashgar and Yarkand are also important centers of rug weaving). The design of many of the rugs is a most interesting mixture of Persian and Chinese styles. The whole treatment is unmistakeably Persian, though many small details are Chinese. The same blending of the Far with the Near East is found in the beautiful embroidery of Khotan. The stitch chiefly used in the embroidery is the Turkish chain stitch, which is not found in the embroidery in China, but the wave and cloud patterns, the butterflies and some of the flowers are definitely of Chinese design. Khotan is also famous for its craftsmanship in brass and copper household utensils decorated with elaborate floral designs in pierced metal work.

328
531
415

286 Kuch in the north has been famous for generations for the
294 gold and silver embroidery on velvet. Women's indoor caps are
531 the chief article of manufacture. The design as a whole is Per-
(199) sian, but the use of circular medallions in embroidery on robes is a Chinese device.

There has been a tremendous decline in all these works of
53 art and articrafts in the present century, mainly because of the
517 availability of factory-manufactured cheap objects of daily use,
199 from both Russia and China proper. Thus, the carpets of
198 Khotan and the surrounding country are slowly disappearing, and their quality has gone down. The expensive handmade items are replaced by the cheap materials provided by modern industry. The class of artists and artisans has declined, since it is impossible for them to compete with new imported products.

517 The artistic expressions inspired by the new Communist re-
532 gime are totally different from the old indigenous ones. They
199 center around paintings and statues glorifying the present-day
668 leaders, and describing episodes from the life of the newly "liberated" working class. Nothing could be more foreign to the spirit and traditions of the Eastern Turkis.

E. Music and Dance

533 The taste for music and dance is highly developed in Sin-
527 kiang, and it constitutes the main means of entertainment for important social occasions. There are professional musicians (maghmatchi) organized in bands of three or four individuals, available for hire. At many public feasts, a band is hired for entertainment. The musicians chant as they play their instruments. The tunes are simple, composed primarily for accompaniment to the dance, or, more often, improvised. To the Western-trained ear, both tune and rhythm are monotonous.

534 Most of the musical instruments used in these bands are of
(199) Persian origin. Grenard lists the following instruments:

Doutar—a long guitar with two strings.

/Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang/

795 to religions other and older than Islam. The Moslem priests,
796 powerless to destroy the popular worship of certain shrines,
798 adopted those shrines and named them after Islamic personages.

The Turki is a great believer in the efficacy of local saints, and there are innumerable shrines all over the country dedicated not only to the "imams," but to later saints and heroes. These sanctuaries usually have some beliefs and observances attached to them, connected either with the curing of diseases or with the bearing of children. At shrines of the latter type, the majority of pilgrims are women. The mullas have therefore been obliged, for the sake of propriety, in each case to invent a female saint, complete with legend, to bring the cult in line with Islam. The
[798] popular names of the shrines reveal that most of these cults
[769] have been derived from the ancient practices of ancestor worship.

771 Paganism, as well as ancestor worship, is still prevalent in
796 this land despite a thousand years of Islam. Many of the religious festivals, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar, are more pagan than Moslem. They are merely popular gatherings for the purpose of feasting and enjoyment, and are probably older than Islam.

793 The clergy in Sinkiang is divided into two categories: the
794 judges and the priests in one, and the simple clerks in the other (the mullas). The latter class includes all males who can read and write and wear a turban. Above these mullas, there is a class of mosque officials with specific functions: the Muazzin, who calls the believers to attend the daily prayers, the Imam, who leads the services, the Mutakib, in charge of seeing that the laws of the Koran are observed, the Reis, prefect of discipline, the Khatib, who delivers the Friday sermon, and the mulla a'lam, doctor of law who is also in charge of the circumcision ceremony.

793 The resources of the clergy consisted mostly of waqf, land
[423] property which had been donated to them or confiscated by them. In spite of the Chinese confiscations of clergy landed property, until recent times this constituted an important source of income for the clergy. Other clergy sources are the Zakat, donations from richer believers, casual fees, judicial fees, and fees paid for marriages, funerals and so forth. The Zakat is not a very substantial source of income, as the Sinkiang Moslems are lax in adhering to this obligation. At present it is almost impossible for the clergy to subsist without resorting to some secular occupation.

793 The judicial power and the police functions of the clergy in
692 the past have diminished greatly during the Chinese administra-
[177] tion. The Qazis judge cases which are brought voluntarily to

181 is "istiklal" which is actually an Arabic loan word. Istiklal means
183 both freedom and independence. Along with the nomadic concep-
[192] tion of the freedom of movement in the vast steppes, there is also a reflection of the concept of political independence and being one's own master. The 19th and 20th centuries brought additional asso-
181 ciations to the word freedom. Along with the rise of nationalistic
183 aspirations, which resulted indirectly from the similar movements
668 in Europe, some Western ideas and notions have reached Turkes-
177 tan indirectly also. Though the Western full concept of freedom and democracy is not comprehended among the majority of the people of Eastern Turkestan, it has added more depth and breadth to the concept of freedom. The awareness of the need for political freedom has grown in Sinkiang in the last century. Sinkiang's history in this period indicates the strong desires and wishes of its people to be free of Chinese rule, or any other foreign domination. The Turkic people strongly resent and resist the encroachment on their freedom of action and political decision. This feeling of resentment is not only experienced by the more sophisticated sedentary population, aspiring for political independence, but is also shared by the nomadic people. The Communists have made attempts to either encroach on their freedom of movement in their searches for pasture land, or have completely attempted to sedentarize them. Thus, not only the economic existence of the nomads is threatened, but the freedom characteristic of their way of life is in danger also. The Communists have not only arrested the political freedom of the Turks and their desires for independence, but have also touched on their traditional values associated with their nomadic past, and threatening the existence of the nomads today.

H. Attitude toward Change

177 There are elements of both resistance and of desire for change
178 among the Eastern Turkis. The dominating social and economic
565 classes - consisting of the wealthy merchants (the Türks call them 'pek mühim ve zengin tüccar', verbatim: "the very important and rich merchants'), landowners (Türk: Emlak sahibi), and clergy (Türk: Rahibler) - opposed change which threatened to undermine their social and material status. The general population aspired to raise their social position and standards of living, but at the same time did not wish to lose their leaders to whom they have always looked for direction and guidance. There is no question that no section of the society aspired to a forced, radical type of change for which they were not prepared. This type of change in the social structure, the complete leveling off of the social classes, with only the party hierarchy in a superior position, which was forced down on the population by the Communists, is an artificial product for which the Turkic society was not ready, nor willing to inflict upon itself.

/Turks of Sinkiang/

177 inflict upon itself.

178 The desire for political change is, on the other hand, quite [668] unanimous and finds expression in the nationalist movement, which aspires to throw the Chinese out of Sinkiang and set up a Turkic government. The only ones who welcome the existing rule are the Turks with positions in the party who have a vested interest in the present regime.

177 The wish for economic and technological change, while in 178 general looked upon with favor, is opposed by those who have 668 vested interests in the present system. The small artisans (Turk: zanaatkar ve el iscililer) and handicraftsmen are likely to lose their livelihood with the coming of such changes. The social changes imposed on the population by the Communist regime, pave the way for the introduction of economic and technological changes. While industries threaten the existence of the small artisans, handicraftsmen, and merchants, the collective state farms, using new agricultural machinery and techniques, would threaten the existence of the small farmer, who could never afford such renovations, and is not encouraged by the present regime to own his land and equipment.

181 I. War and Peace Concepts

The Moslems are known in China for their courage in battles and their rebellious spirit. They are known to make good soldiers, when fighting for a cause they believe in. Their skill and talent in way enjoys a reputation as being superior to that of the Chinese.

181 The Turks have inherited their tradition of war and their 721 fighting spirit from their nomadic ancestors, descendants of the 779 great Turkic empires in Central Asia. War is not only a Turkic tradition, but a strong conception of war is also included in the Moslem religion. One of the five primary duties of a Moslem is to go on a Holy War (Jihad) and to fight in the name of Allah against the non-believers. This tradition stems from the early days of Islam during Mohammed's attempts to overcome his opponents, and it was particularly stressed during the days of the Moslem political and religious expansion. A Holy War today still is an important tool for rallying the believers of Islam to war, although its effectiveness cannot be compared with the times of the past.

While the duty of war is impressed on the believer against the domain of war, peace is the order in the domain of Islam among all the believers. 'Peace, in Turkic 'baris', has the connotation of giving each other shelter. It is important to keep in mind that while the Turks in Sinkiang could quite easily be rallied to war under an Islamic flag, fighting side by side with the Chinese is a totally different matter. The emotional cause and motivation, and the feeling of loyalty which constitute the important elements of the morale of any army, would be completely lacking there,

/Mongols of the Northwest/

These feelings and emotional attitudes were hardly sufficient to arouse animosity or hatred toward the Chinese but rather an unjustified and unwarranted feeling of superiority. The progressive advancement of Chinese settlers, however, who gradually took over lot after lot of their pasture land led not only to hatred but resulted in petty uprisings, so that even the Manchu government several times issued laws against Chinese advancements, which were hardly ever observed. Complaints of the Mongol leaders did not help and they were numerically too weak for military action.

Only in the case of the sedentary Mongols of the Northwest, the Monguors, such problems never arose, as they had become so strongly sinified that their tribal leaders were considered by the Chinese themselves as Chinese officials with a reputation of absolute loyalty.

D. Attitudes toward the Communist Regime

Throughout the history of the Mongols, their pattern of living, internal and external, changed very little. Their families constituted auls, the auls, clans and the clans, tribes. Besides this structural organization, there existed the military institutions of banners and leagues. The internal order was always strict and the laws and regulations hard. A leader who was not strict and hard would hardly be considered as a leader and the history of the Mongols shows that a strong leader always evoked their respect and found them to be submissive followers.

In view of this fact there is little doubt that the Mongols of the Northwest will respect the iron hand of Peking, even though probably with mixed emotions. The creation of autonomous chous (districts) populated only or overwhelmingly by Mongols might give them a certain feeling of self-determination and cultural autonomy. The organization of veterinarian stations which take care of their livestock will certainly be welcome to the nomads; the organization of a widespread educational system might be another asset for the Communists as it fosters Mongolian language and promotes literature written in Mongolian. The establishment of permanent winter sites, on the other hand, which is contradictory to Mongol customs and above all the threatening collectivization of their livestock, which is the Mongols' highest and greatest treasure, are negative aspects. This, of course, refers to the present generation only. The younger and youngest generation, subject to a very vivid and propagandistic education will undoubtedly change their attitude toward the present regime, a process for which the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia are a classic example. (see also IMAR Handbook, same section).

III. The Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans

An attempt at a cohesive description of popular attitudes among

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*175 leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places,
*668 a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng
474 and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were sus-
[476] pended." As to agricultural cooperatives, the number increased from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November 1954, to 17,000 or 16,83 per cent of the population by summer of last year. Plans are to increase the number fo 35,000 by 1957 to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of the total farming households.

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[476] Kansu: in this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000 in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151 in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to comprise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural population was organized. (67.93 per cent)

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175 Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the
• 178 summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to
474 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with
476 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328 households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population. The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955 there were 6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural population in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 45,62 per cent of the farmers were organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 178 668 Sinkiang: Party work was also slow in this province. Although at the end of 1953, it was reported that 75.68 per cent of the 6,400 new Party members were recruited from the national minorities, only 26.1 per cent of the responsible personnel in party committees of county level and higher were natives. The Chinese members still predominated. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were in 1955 a total of 57,228 members in Sinkiang, and this organization supplied 3,900 of its members to the Chinese Communist Party.

Compared to the rest of Sinkiang, the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou did much better in the recruitment of party members. From 1950 to March, 1955, it recruited a total of 1,100 new party members from the activists.

VII. Formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region

A. Extend and Limitations of Regional Autonomy

175 668 642 563 179 The expansion of Chinese Communist Party membership, the transfer of local cadres to the work of cooperative-building in the rural areas and the collectivization of the people, the relegation of native cadres to unimportant government posts, and the influx of hordes of cadres and workers from China Proper to take over the governments and state enterprises were preliminary steps preparatory to the conferring of regional autonomy to the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. Self-rule has been an objective for which the minority peoples of Chinese Turkestan aspired and struggled, and the promises of self-determination and self-government were the chief planks of the political platform of the Chinese Communists. However, the definition of what constitutes autonomy for the minority peoples has undergone evolution.

As early as 1930, Mao Tse-tung had declared that the non-Chinese racial minorities "have a right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic." (The Soviets in China, p. 440 quoted in Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 115). This was incorporated in Article 14 of the constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated in 1931, with the omission of the right to join the USSR.

The Chinese Communists reaffirmed their promise of autonomy to the nationality minorities when they came to power in 1949, but autonomy was to be within the federal framework of the Chinese People's Republic and no mention was made of the right of secession by the non-Chinese minorities. The Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949, promised only regional self-government and preservation of the language, religion and culture of the minority peoples,

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392 Five tractor repair works were under construction in 1955.
493 Each plant will have sixteen or fifteen mechanized worships. When completed, they will be able to repair as many as 475 tractors and combine harvesters each year in addition to making other farm tools and spare parts.

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327 There are scattered reports on other industrial developments
398 in Sinkiang, such as: (1) the August First Iron and Steel Plant,
399 (2) the October Motor Car Repair and Assembly Shop, (3) the
256 Urumchi Automatic Electric Plant, (4) the modernized August
288 First Flour Mill, (5) the Khotan Silk Factory, (6) Houcheng
399 Airplane Manufacturing Factory, and (7) more than a dozen
237 animal products processing plants, which process skins, furs
439 and intestines for the purpose of exporting them to the Soviet Union. But detailed information on these projects is not available.

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121 5. Handicrafts.
178 The foregoing analysis concerns itself with the development of modern industries in the Northwest under the Communist
463 regime. But handicrafts still play a very important role in this area as they do in other parts of the country. According to a
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463 1951 report, the main handicrafts in the Northwest were as follows:

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[289] (1) Cotton cloth. A side line of the peasant, it was produced practically everywhere in the area. However, the more important producing districts are: 1. Sian, Paochi, in Shensi, 2. Tienshui, Ho-hsi and Min-chin in Kansu, and 3. Turfan, toqsun and
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[433] Aqsu in Sinkiang. In terms of quantities, the total annual output in Shensi is approximately 3,779,670 pieces; in Kansu, 3,505,760 pieces; in Sinkiang, 4,400,000 pieces.

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[323] (2) Pottery. The annual output of pottery in the Northwest amounts to over 4,000,000 pieces. Of that amount Shensi produces
[433] more than 3,000,000 pieces, Kansu, 500,000, Ninghsia, 200,000, and Sinkiang, 50,000. The more famous pottery-producing districts are: 1. Huang-pao-chen and Chen-lu-chen in Tung-chuan, Shensi, which have been famous since the Sung Dynasty, 2. Yaokai in Yung-teng, Kansu, 3. Ah-kan-chen, Lanchou, Kansu, and An-kou-yao, Hua-ting, Kansu. The production consists mainly of pots, bowls, tea-pots, plates and tea-cups.

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463 (3) Paper. While paper is manufactured in many places in this
289 area, the more important paper-producing districts are: 1. Nancheng (Han-chung), Shensi, 2. Khotan, Sinkiang, 3. K'ang-cheng and Tien-shui, Kansu, and 4. Ying-chuan, Ninghsia. The main varieties are as follows:

(a) The "rough-edge" paper. Usually used as a writing paper,
N it is produced and consumed mainly in Shensi. The annual output
[433] is about 192,490 bundles.

(b) The "Flax paper." It may be made of white or black flax,